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Executive Summary 
As the country heads into economic downturn, 28 states (including the District of Columbia) are 
forecasting budget deficits for the coming fiscal year, which collectively exceed $39 billion. 
Because the current downturn is following unusually quickly on the heels of the last economic 
slowdown, states are less well-positioned than they were in the past to withstand the adverse 
effects of lost revenue and increased costs. Without federal help, many states may be required to 
increase taxes or cut spending for Medicaid and other services to meet balanced budget 
requirements. Already, Medicaid and SCHIP cuts are proposed in 13 states; K-12 education is 
targeted in 9 states; higher education funding is proposed for reductions in 12 states; and 7 states 
have either increased taxes or are considering such increases.  In light of these economic 
conditions, this paper examines:   
x The effect of an economic downturn on Medicaid and SCHIP enrollment and spending as 
well as the number of uninsured;  
x Whether past federal fiscal relief was effective in preventing Medicaid cuts and providing 
economic stimulus, and  
x Options for structuring federal fiscal relief in the future.   
The key findings of the paper are: 
Economic Downturns Increase Medicaid Enrollment and Spending - This analysis shows that 
a 1 percentage point rise in the national unemployment rate would increase Medicaid and SCHIP 
enrollment by 1 million (600,000 children and 400,000 non-elderly adults) and cause the number 
of uninsured to grow by 1.1 million.  That would increase Medicaid and SCHIP costs by $3.4 
billion, including $1.4 billion in state spending.  This represents a 1 percent increase in total 
Medicaid and SCHIP expenditures.
Economic Downturns Reduce State Revenues - Medicaid and SCHIP are also affected by state 
revenue declines.  Recent Urban Institute research shows that a 1 percentage point increase in the 
unemployment rate causes state General Fund revenue to drop by 3 to 4 percent below expected 
levels. If states must balance their budgets and all state spending is reduced proportionately, a 1 
percentage point increase in unemployment would therefore entail a 3 to 4 percent reduction in 
Medicaid and SCHIP spending.  Even if these health programs absorb somewhat less than their 
proportionate share of state revenue losses, revenue effects clearly exceed enrollment increases 
as a fiscal problem for Medicaid and SCHIP. 
State Policy Responses Can Worsen Cyclical Downturns - Unlike the federal government, 
almost all states are legally required to balance their budgets.  To meet this requirement in times 
of economic stress, states may take such steps as tapping reserves, borrowing from trust funds, 
securitizing future revenue streams, delaying spending from one fiscal year to the next, etc.  
Even after such efforts, states frequently need to increase taxes or cut spending on Medicaid, 
post-secondary education, aid to localities, or other priorities. All of the latter actions tend to 
worsen the economic downturn.  
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Moreover, the need to cut Medicaid during economic decline limits the program’s ability to 
function as an automatic fiscal stabilizer. Such stabilizers are some of the country’s most 
effective buffers that alleviate the harmful effects of the business cycle. They automatically 
stimulate the economy when it weakens and retract stimulus when it improves.  This feature of 
unemployment insurance, an automatic fiscal stabilizer with many fewer dollars than the portion 
of Medicaid that responds to economic changes, saves more than 130,000 jobs in the average 
recession’s peak year. Restructuring Medicaid to achieve similar results could improve economic 
security while preventing cutbacks in health coverage during economic decline. 
Federal Fiscal Relief in 2003-2004 Had Positive Effects - In response to the last economic 
downturn, which took place earlier this decade, the federal government passed the Jobs and 
Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA), which provided $20 billion in fiscal relief to 
states:  $10 billion in the form of block grants and the other $10 billion in a 2.95 percentage point 
increase to each state’s federal medical assistance percentage, or FMAP (the percentage of 
Medicaid spending paid by the federal government).  As a condition of receiving this enhanced 
FMAP, states had to agree not to reduce Medicaid eligibility standards below prior levels.  The 
FMAP increase prevented formal Medicaid eligibility cuts and allowed restoration of some 
previous cutbacks.  In addition, reductions of other kinds were limited in scope (though not 
entirely eliminated), thanks to additional federal resources.  
However, delays in reaching federal agreement meant that many states made large reductions 
before fiscal relief was available.  Because states varied in the length and depth as well as the 
beginning and end points of their economic downturns, a uniform FMAP increase meant that 
some states got assistance at the wrong time and some obtained less help than they required.   
Congress May Consider Options to Better Target Federal Relief - As states enter a new 
economic downturn, policymakers could consider three basic options for fiscal relief.  One 
approach would, like JGTRRA, provide a uniform increase in Medicaid matching rates to all 
states, for a specified time.   
A second option would be partially targeted. For a Congressionally defined period, states that 
meet certain criteria would receive a uniform increase in their Medicaid matching rates.  Such an 
approach is proposed in the Economic Recovery in Health Care Act of 2008.
Third, policymakers could consider fully targeted assistance that would use economic conditions 
to determine whether a state receives help, the amount the state obtains, and the time period 
when assistance is furnished. Congress could provide fully targeted assistance through a 
temporary measure that would appropriate a specific amount of money, available for expenditure 
over multiple years, but only to states that meet specified criteria showing economic distress. 
Alternatively, policymakers could make an ongoing change to the Medicaid and SCHIP statutes 
that would provide automatic, countercyclical adjustments to states that experience serious 
economic downturns (for both the present slowdown and in the future).
For any of these three options, Medicaid federal fiscal relief could be coupled with a broader 
state fiscal relief package focused on more general budget problems facing the states.   
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Each approach for Medicaid/SCHIP fiscal relief has its advantages. The uniform approach has 
been tested and was generally effective, is simple, and all states would gain.  A partially targeted 
approach would focus assistance on states with the greatest need. A fully targeted approach 
would provide the most money to the states in greatest difficulty, so a given amount of federal 
funds would go farther to preserve health coverage and provide stimulus in the states that are 
experiencing the deepest economic decline. It would also prevent federal funds from being spent 
on states that experience economic recovery.   
Fully targeted policies have been proposed by General Accountability Office (GAO) and 
legislation reauthorizing SCHIP that the Senate passed during the summer of 2007.   There are 
many ways to structure such a policy option, but the key principles to consider include the 
following:
1. Assistance would vary with the depth and length of each state’s economic distress;  
2. Assistance would begin and end based on changes to state economic indicators; and 
3. Funds would be sufficient to offset state costs associated with increased enrollment and the 
Medicaid/SCHIP share of projected state revenue losses.  
Federal Fiscal Relief Can Prevent Medicaid Cuts During Economic Downturns  -  As a new 
economic downturn unfolds, many states appear headed for serious budget shortfalls. Economic 
hard times reduce state revenues and increase the number of people who qualify for need-based 
benefit programs. Because of state balanced budget requirements, these trends eventually cause 
many states to increase taxes and fees or cut Medicaid, SCHIP, and other services precisely 
when such services and the resulting economic stimulus are most needed. The federal 
government does not have balanced budget requirements, so it has the flexibility to target 
supplemental funds to states during an economic downturn, preventing harmful and ill-timed 
cuts in health coverage. Regardless of how federal policymakers structure assistance, state fiscal 
problems are emerging that warrant serious consideration as part of an ongoing national strategy 
to minimize the duration, severity, and consequences of economic downturn. 
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Medicaid, SCHIP and Economic Downturn:
Policy Challenges and Policy Responses 
1.  Introduction 
As a new economic downturn unfolds, the National Governors Association, 1 legislators in both 
Houses of Congress,2 and key stakeholder groups3 are urging federal policymakers to provide 
states with federal resources that can be used to stave off Medicaid cutbacks. This paper analyzes 
whether such resources are needed and, if so, how they could be deployed.  We begin by 
exploring the relationship between economic slowdowns and health coverage programs like 
Medicaid and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). We then describe what 
happened in 2003-2004, when states received extra federal resources to help cover increased 
Medicaid costs associated with economic downturn. Finally, we analyze current policy options 
available to Congress if it decides to provide states with new resources to prevent reductions in 
Medicaid and SCHIP coverage. 
Of course, states are adversely affected by economic downturns in ways that extend well beyond 
Medicaid and SCHIP.  Cuts in other programs and state tax increases can, like health coverage 
reductions, deepen or prolong recession while increasing the adverse impact of economic 
downturn on state residents.  In response, Congress could follow the general example set earlier 
this decade, which combined state fiscal relief targeted to health coverage with a more general 
block grant, as explained in detail below.  This paper focuses only on fiscal relief measures 
targeted to Medicaid and SCHIP. 
2. Economic Downturns and Health Insurance Coverage  
Health coverage and the business cycle affect one another in three different ways. First, when the 
economy slows down or goes into recession, many people lose employer-sponsored insurance. 
This raises the number of uninsured as well as the number of people who qualify for Medicaid 
and SCHIP,4 increasing publicly funded health care costs. Second, at the same time that 
unemployment drives up state costs for Medicaid and other need-based assistance, state revenues 
decline. Because of state balanced budget requirements, Medicaid and other assistance is most 
likely to be cut when state residents have the greatest need for help. Third, Medicaid’s 
responsiveness to changed economic conditions acts as an automatic fiscal stabilizer, stimulating 
the economy in response to downturn and withdrawing that stimulus when beneficiaries obtain 
employment and leave Medicaid for employer-sponsored insurance. Such capacity to act as an 
automatic fiscal stabilizer could be strengthened if states received federal resources that 
prevented Medicaid cutbacks during economic downturns. Before we explore any of these 
general relationships between health programs and the economy, we briefly describe current 
fiscal conditions at the state level. 
A. Emerging State Budget Problems 
The economy is clearly in a downturn and possibly a recession.5  As one would expect, that has 
repercussions for state budgets. For the coming fiscal year, 28 states (including the District of 
Columbia) anticipate budget deficits, which collectively exceed $39 billion.6  Three other states 
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anticipate deficits beginning the following year. Without federal help, state balanced budget 
requirements will force many states to increase taxes or cut Medicaid, SCHIP, or other services.  
   
This round of state budget problems may present particular challenges to state policymakers, for 
several reasons. First, many states have less capacity than in the past to make relatively painless 
reductions. The three previous economic downturns occurred roughly once a decade – in the 
early 1980s, the early 1990s, and the early years of the current decade. The present downturn is 
beginning with approximately half that much time having elapsed since the last economic 
slowdown. Accordingly, compared to previous downturns, states have restored fewer prior 
reductions to Medicaid and other services.7  This new round of cutbacks will therefore be made 
against a lower baseline service level.  
Second, many localities are experiencing significant fiscal difficulty. Most cities depend on 
property tax revenues, which can be disproportionately affected by the problems of the housing 
market that are a driving force in the current downturn. According to the National League of 
Cities, 62 percent of cities have seen an increase in foreclosures, and 33 percent are experiencing 
or projecting a drop in revenue, compared to one year ago.8   In prior slowdowns, by contrast, 
housing was an area of economic strength, helping limit fiscal damage. Compared to past 
downturns, states now have less capacity to address their budget challenges by shifting 
responsibilities to localities or cutting their aid. 
   
Already, Governors and other state officials are proposing significant cutbacks. Medicaid and 
SCHIP cuts are proposed in 13 states; K-12 education is targeted in 9 states; higher education 
funding is proposed for reductions in 12 states; and 7 states have either increased taxes or are 
considering such increases.9
While serious budget problems loom in many places, state circumstances vary.  For January 
2008, when the national unemployment rate was 4.9 percent, 5 states had unemployment rates of 
6.0 percent or more, while 4 states had unemployment rates under 3.0 percent (Figure 1). From 
January 2007 to January 2008, 15 states experienced a decline in unemployment, while 13 
experienced increases of 0.5 percentage points or more (Figure 2). (As with all figures in this 
paper that depict the numbers of states that fit various categories, the District of Columbia is 
counted as a state.)
FIGURE 1. NUMBER OF STATES WITH UNEMPLOYMENT RATES AT VARIOUS LEVELS:  
JANUARY 2008
4
12
19
11
5
0% to 2.9% 3.0% to 3.9% 4.0% to 5.9% 5.0% to 5.9% 6.0+%
Unemployment rate
Number of states
Source:  Bureau of Labor Statistics, February 2008, reporting seasonally adjusted unemployment rates. 
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FIGURE 2. NUMBER OF STATES EXPERIENCING VARIOUS CHANGES IN UNEMPLOYMENT 
RATES: JANUARY 2007 TO JANUARY 2008 
5
10
23
8
5
-0.9 to -0.5 -0.4 to -0.1 0 to +0.4 +0.5 to +0.9 +1.0 or more
Percentage point change in state unemployment rate
Number of states
Source:  Authors’ calculations, BLS seasonally adjusted unemployment rates. 
Note: many of these changes were not statistically significant, according to BLS. Among states experiencing statistically significant
changes in unemployment rates from January 2007 to January 2008, 19 states experienced increased unemployment and 4 
experienced declines.10
B. Economic Downturns, Changes in Insurance Coverage, and Medicaid Spending 
Much of Medicaid spending is independent of the business cycle. Unemployment has the least 
effect on enrollment among the elderly and disabled, whose care comprises the bulk of Medicaid 
spending.  Nevertheless, important portions of Medicaid and SCHIP respond to changes in the 
business cycle. As unemployment increases, workers and dependents may lose access to 
employer coverage; this can happen through unemployment, through employer reductions in 
subsidies paid for health coverage, through reduced eligibility for employer-sponsored insurance 
(ESI) because of fewer hours of employment, etc. Some who lose employer-based coverage 
become uninsured, potentially increasing state and local uncompensated care costs. Others enroll 
in a spouse’s employer plan, non-group coverage, or, if eligible, Medicaid or SCHIP. The 
following is a brief discussion of our methods and findings as we sought to quantify those 
relationships. Our methods are explained in more detail in Appendix I.  
We examined state-level data from multiple years (1990 through 2003) of the Current Population 
Survey (CPS) as well as other sources. We estimated regression models of coverage rates for 
four coverage types-- ESI, Medicaid/SCHIP (also including other state-funded coverage), non-
group private coverage, and a lack of health coverage.  The models were structured to estimate 
the relationship between each type of coverage and the unemployment rate.  We then projected 
what insurance coverage would be in 2008 in the absence of an economic downturn.  Using the 
regression models, we estimated the impact of unemployment on the number of adults and 
children in each coverage category, including Medicaid and SCHIP.  We then used Medicaid and 
SCHIP spending data, adjusted for expected differences between the health status of previous 
and new enrollees, to estimate the impact on these programs’ expenditures. 
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The Effects of Rising Unemployment on Coverage – For children, the results shown in Table 1 
show that a 1.0 percentage point increase in the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate would 
cause the proportion of children receiving employer-sponsored insurance to fall by 0.95 
percentage points but Medicaid/SCHIP coverage to increase by 0.79 percentage points.  Changes 
in non-group coverage and uninsurance were not statistically significant. These results indicate 
that broad coverage through Medicaid and SCHIP offsets most of children’s decline in ESI 
during an economic downturn.   
For adults under age 65, the picture is somewhat different.  A 1.0 percentage point rise in the 
unemployment rate would reduce the proportion of adults with employer-sponsored insurance by 
0.92 percentage points. The proportion of adults receiving Medicaid would rise by 0.20 
percentage points, non-group coverage would increase by 0.18 percentage points, and the 
percentage of adults without coverage would grow by 0.59 percentage points.  Because Medicaid 
and SCHIP provide much less coverage for adults than for children, newly unemployed adults 
are more likely, compared to children, to end up with non-group coverage or to become 
uninsured.
TABLE 1.  THE ESTIMATED EFFECT OF A 1 PERCENTAGE POINT INCREASE IN THE 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE ON THE PERCENTAGE OF CHILDREN AND NON-ELDERLY ADULTS 
WITH VARIOUS TYPES OF HEALTH COVERAGE 
Children Non-elderly adults 
ESI -0.95 percentage points -0.92 percentage points 
Medicaid/SCHIP +0.79 percentage points +0.20 percentage points 
Uninsured No statistically significant change +0.59 percentage points 
Non-group coverage No statistically significant change +0.18 percentage points 
Source: Urban Institute, February 2008.   
Note: ESI is employer-sponsored insurance.  
As shown in Table 2, below, we concluded that, with a 1.0 percentage point increase in 
unemployment, the number of children and adults with employer-sponsored-insurance in 2008 
would decline by 700,000 and 1.7 million, respectively.  The number of children on Medicaid 
and SCHIP would increase by 600,000; the number of adults would rise by 400,000.  The lesser 
increase in adult enrollment reflects both the smaller estimated effect of increased unemployment 
as well as the lower number of Medicaid-covered adults, relative to children receiving Medicaid 
or SCHIP. The number of uninsured adults would rise by 1.1 million. 
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TABLE 2. THE NATIONAL IMPACT OF A 1 PERCENTAGE POINT INCREASE IN UNEMPLOYMENT 
ON THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN AND NON-ELDERLY ADULTS WITH VARIOUS TYPES OF 
HEALTH COVERAGE: 2008 
Children Non-elderly 
adults
Total
ESI -700,000 -1.7 million -2.5 million 
Medicaid/SCHIP +600,000 +400,000 +1.0 million 
Uninsured No statistically significant change +1.1 million +1.1 million 
Non-group coverage No statistically significant change +300,000 +400,000 
Source:  Urban Institute, February 2008. 
Notes:  (1) ESI is employer-sponsored insurance. (2) Totals may not add because of rounding and changes that, disaggregated, are
less than statistically significant. 
Impacts on Medicaid Expenditures - Based on current Medicaid/SCHIP spending on adults and 
children, as explained above, we concluded that the 2008 cost per new Medicaid/SCHIP enrollee 
would be $2,313 for children and $5,386 for adults.  Multiplying these cost estimates by the 
changes in coverage shown in Table 2, we found that Medicaid/SCHIP spending would increase 
by $1.4 billion for children and $2.0 billion for non-elderly adults, for an overall increase of $3.4 
billion. This would represent a 1 percent rise in total Medicaid/SCHIP spending. 
The states’ share of national Medicaid spending was about 43 percent.  Taking into account 
SCHIP’s higher federal matching rate, we estimated that state Medicaid and SCHIP spending 
would increase by about $1.4 billion for each 1.0 percentage point increase in the unemployment 
rate (Table 3).  
TABLE 3. THE NATIONAL IMPACT OF A 1 PERCENTAGE POINT INCREASE IN UNEMPLOYMENT 
ON PROJECTED MEDICAID AND SCHIP COSTS: 2008 
Children Non-elderly 
adults
Elderly 
adults
Total
Total $70.9  
billion
$193.2
billion
$71.6
billion
$335.6
billion
Baseline projected costs 
State share $29.5 $83.1 $30.8 $143.3 
Total $1.4 $2.0 $0 $3.4 
State share $0.6 $0.9 $0 $1.4 
Additional costs for each 
1.0 percentage point 
increase in 
unemployment rates 
Percentage 
increase 
2.0
percent
1.0
percent
0.0
percent
1.0
percent
Sources: Urban Institute, February 2008; Congressional Budget Office, March 2007 Medicaid and SCHIP baselines.   
Notes: (1) ESI is employer-sponsored insurance. (2) Totals may not add because of rounding. (3) The cost increases for children,
including the state share of such costs, assume the increase is divided between Medicaid and SCHIP in proportion to each 
program’s current aggregate spending on children. (4) This table underestimates the impact of unemployment on Medicaid costs 
because it does not include any change in seniors’ enrollment. We expect any effects on seniors’ enrollment to be smaller than for
the non-elderly population. 
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C. The impact of State Balanced Budget Requirements on Sustaining  Medicaid and 
SCHIP During Economic Downturns 
Revenue Effects Have Serious Consequences for Medicaid - Not only do caseloads for 
Medicaid and other need-based programs rise during economic downturns, state revenues 
decline. According to recent Urban Institute research, each 1 percentage point increase in 
unemployment rates leads to a 3 to 4 percent average decline in state General Fund revenue, 
compared to projected levels.11  Assuming that, because of state balanced budget requirements, 
state revenues generally equal state spending, Medicaid and SCHIP would experience 3 to 4 
percent cutbacks if the revenue decline from a 1 percentage point increase in unemployment 
were distributed evenly across all state programs. Even if Medicaid and SCHIP absorb somewhat 
less than their proportionate share of revenue losses, revenue effects would still exceed increases 
in Medicaid and SCHIP costs during an economic downturn.
Because almost all states are legally required to balance their budgets, the loss of revenue and 
increase in expenditures resulting from economic downturn often lead to significant cuts to 
Medicaid and other state programs that are intended to help vulnerable populations.12
Accordingly, it is precisely when state residents have the greatest need for help that assistance is 
most likely to be cut back.
In states that spare Medicaid and other need-based programs, cutbacks may affect other areas 
important to long-term economic growth, including higher education. Some states raise taxes or 
cut aid to localities. Such steps can delay economic recovery. 
Medicaid Cuts Can Occur Late in an Economic Cycle - Depending on the state, the most 
painful measures may take place relatively late in economic downturns. Before state officials 
take drastic steps, they may spend from “rainy day funds;” borrow from special budget accounts 
(promising to repay them after the economy returns to normal); securitize future income streams; 
impose a hiring freeze on state employees; delay certain expenses from one fiscal year to the 
next; etc. Some states exhaust such steps before turning to major Medicaid cutbacks and other 
severe measures to bring their budgets into balance.   
Medicaid and SCHIP cutbacks can also be delayed because of their effect on federal matching 
funds. Eliminating a dollar in Medicaid spending saves no more than 50 cents in state General 
Fund money and, in the poorest states with the highest federal matching rates, less than 30 cents.  
This means that more severe cuts are needed to save a given sum of state dollars through 
Medicaid reductions than for cutbacks in other services, which deters some state policymakers 
from turning quickly to large Medicaid savings.13
Of course, this sequence is not universally applicable. Some state policymakers may prefer to cut 
programs that serve low-income people before raising taxes or reducing services for middle-class 
constituents. A number of states are already considering Medicaid cutbacks, even at this early 
stage of the current economic downturn, as explained above.
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D. Medicaid’s Impact on the Economy  
As with other state spending, Medicaid dollars stimulate local economies. This health coverage 
program has an especially pronounced impact, however. It brings matching federal funds into the 
state, generating economic activity with between $1 and $3 in matching federal dollars for each 
dollar spent by the state, depending on the state’s Federal Medical Assistance Percentage 
(FMAP), which is the proportion of Medicaid costs paid by the federal government. In addition, 
a higher proportion of money spent to purchase health care remains within the state, compared to 
money spent on general goods and services, more of which tend to originate outside state 
boundaries.14
As noted above, changes in unemployment affect health spending.  When the economy declines, 
Medicaid spending rises. When the economy improves, Medicaid continues to grow but at a 
slower rate. Medicaid is thus widely acknowledged to function as a countercyclical, automatic 
fiscal stabilizer.15  Because such stabilizers inject and withdraw stimulus in an automatic 
response to economic changes, without waiting for a decision by policymakers, they avoid the 
problem of poor timing that notoriously afflicts discretionary fiscal policy.16
No rigorous research analyzes the magnitude of Medicaid’s economic contributions during 
recession. However, there is a good chance that it already plays a critical role ameliorating 
economic downturns. With another automatic fiscal stabilizer – unemployment insurance (UI) -- 
careful macroeconomic simulations have concluded that it mitigates the loss in real GDP by 15 
to 17 percent and saves more than 130,000 jobs in the average recession’s peak year.17
While no comparable simulations have quantified the countercyclical impact of Medicaid, the 
portion of this program that serves low-income families may play a role like UI's. UI and 
Medicaid are the two state programs most affected by changes in the business cycle.18  The 
Medicaid eligibility categories that are most responsive to unemployment – namely, children and 
low-income adults – involve significantly more funding than does UI (Figure 3).  
FIGURE 3. MEDICAID SPENDING ON CHILDREN AND LOW-INCOME FAMILIES VS. TOTAL 
SPENDING ON UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: FY 2004 
$75.1
$40.6
Medicaid (not including
the elderly or disabled)
Unemployment insurance
Billions of 
dollars
Sources: The Urban Institute and Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured estimates based on data from Medicaid 
Statistical Information System reports from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2007; authors' calculations, UI benefit
and extended benefit totals from 4th quarter of calendar 2003 through 3rd quarter of calendar 2004, U.S. Department of Labor.  
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Moreover, during the last two economic downturns, the increase in Medicaid spending 
associated with increased unemployment was larger than the increase in UI expenditures 
(Figures 4 and 5).
FIGURE 4. CHANGES IN MEDICAID SPENDING, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SPENDING, AND 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES: 1989–1993
-10
0
10
20
30
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Medicaid (billions of dollars) Unemployment Insurance (billions of dollars)
Unemployment Rate (tenths of a percent)
Source: Authors’ calculations, Bureau of Economic Analysis National Income and Product Account data (NIPA data)19 and BLS 
annual unemployment rates. 
FIGURE 5. CHANGES IN MEDICAID SPENDING, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SPENDING, AND 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES: 1999–2003 
-10
0
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20
30
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Medicaid (billions of dollars) Unemployment Insurance (billions of dollars)
Unemployment Rate (tenths of a percent)
  Source: Authors’ calculations, NIPA data and BLS annual unemployment rates. 
While this analysis has many serious limitations,20 the numbers are suggestive. Medicaid’s 
current macroeconomic effects may be comparable to UI’s, in general magnitude. Moreover, 
Medicaid could play a more effective role as an automatic fiscal stabilizer if federal policy were 
changed to reduce states’ need to make cutbacks during economic hard times. Such a change 
could enhance the country’s ability to recover from economic downturns.  
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3.  Prior Policy Response:  2003-2004 FMAP Increase 
Because of the economic downturn that began in 2001, Medicaid enrollment grew and state 
revenues declined, continuing well into fiscal 2004.  In the early years of the economic 
slowdown, many states responded by increasing revenues in various ways. States like 
Massachusetts and New York raised income taxes, other states increased user fees, and a number 
of states applied new provider taxes, which, when coupled with higher Medicaid reimbursement 
rates, had the effect of generating additional federal matching payments.  Some states also tapped 
into “rainy day” funds, securitized tobacco settlement dollars, and borrowed from trust funds.21
But these measures were not sufficient to offset state revenue declines. To address budget 
shortfalls, states cut their Medicaid spending by scaling back benefits, freezing or trimming 
provider payment levels, and reducing eligibility.  With state revenues continuing to decline well 
after the recession was declared officially over in November 2001, Congress eventually passed 
the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief and Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA) of 2003.  The law was 
enacted in May 2003 and provided $20 billion in fiscal relief to states.  JGTRRA furnished half 
of this money, based on state population, in the form of block grants usable "to provide essential 
government services and to cover the costs of complying with any federal intergovernmental 
mandate.” The other half was spent to increase federal matching payments under Medicaid.22
At the time, standard FMAP payments under Medicaid varied from 50 percent in the highest-
income states to 77 percent in Mississippi, the lowest-income state.  The FMAP represents the 
percentage of Medicaid costs paid by the federal government. On average, the federal 
government paid about 57 percent of all Medicaid spending.  The JGTRRA increased each 
state’s FMAP by 2.95 percentage points during the last two quarters of federal fiscal year 2003
(April 1, 2003 – September 30, 2003) and the first three quarters of federal fiscal year 2004 
(October 1, 2003 - June 30, 2004).  On July 1, 2004, the temporary matching rate increases 
expired, and all states saw their FMAPs return to normal levels.  JGTRRA required that, to 
qualify for the temporary FMAP increase, a state needed to maintain the formal Medicaid 
eligibility standards that were in place on September 2, 2003.
The temporary FMAP increase reduced the extent of cutbacks to Medicaid and SCHIP, 
preserving health coverage and providing stimulus during the time period covered by the 
legislation.  As a result of the maintenance of effort requirement for eligibility standards, states 
avoided planned eligibility reductions and restored cuts that were made after September 2, 
2003.23 Surveys by the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured and the National 
Association of State Budget Officers found that:24
x 22-25 states used these resources to avoid, lessen, or postpone Medicaid cutbacks; and 
x 5-7 states used these resources to restore previous Medicaid cutbacks or make other program 
expansions.
While states still made some Medicaid cuts when JGTRRA was in effect, state officials reported 
that the reductions would have been even greater without the federal funding.25  Some of the 
policy changes that were made to control Medicaid spending included provider rate cuts and 
freezes, new co-payments, more aggressive use of inter-governmental transfers to increase 
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federal matching payments through supplemental reimbursement programs, and administrative 
policy changes to reduce the number of Medicaid beneficiaries by making it harder to enroll or 
remain covered. SCHIP was not affected by the FMAP legislation, and some states cut SCHIP 
eligibility or capped enrollment.26
Most states used these funds to pay for Medicaid spending. However, because the economy in 
Florida had largely recovered by the time fiscal relief was provided, that state spent its enhanced 
FMAP for other purposes, including economic development projects and building up state 
reserves.27
Finally, while JGTRRA greatly reduced the extent of health coverage cutbacks after it came into 
effect, delays in reaching federal agreement meant that the relief was not well timed for many 
states.  It took more than year of debate for federal policymakers to reach agreement on 
JGTRRA.28 Since the legislation was enacted relatively late during the economic downturn, most 
states had already made substantial Medicaid cuts.29 If fiscal relief had been available sooner, 
many of these cuts may not have been necessary.   More broadly, a uniform, Congressionally-
determined period of assistance meant that aid was unavailable if states needed help at other 
times. Among large states, for example, the enhanced FMAP missed all five quarters in which 
unemployment in Florida reached 5.5 percent or more; it missed the final four out of the nine 
quarters in which unemployment in Ohio was above 6.0 percent; and it missed the first three out 
of the seven quarters in which unemployment in Illinois exceeded 6.5 percent (Figure 6).  
FIGURE 6: AVERAGE QUARTERLY UNEMPLOYMENT RATES IN FLORIDA, ILLINOIS, AND OHIO 
AND THE TEMPORARY FMAP INCREASE: 2000-2005 
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Source: Authors’ calculations from Bureau of Labor Statistics monthly, seasonally adjusted unemployment rates, January 2008. 
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4. Current Policy Options  
Some federal policymakers are considering options for providing state fiscal relief during the 
current economic downturn.30  To help states avert cutbacks to Medicaid and SCHIP, lawmakers 
could enact a uniform approach like that used in JGTRRA, which provides all states with the 
identical level of assistance for a Congressionally-defined period of time; a partially targeted 
approach that limits assistance to states in distress but provides each such state with the identical 
level of assistance for a Congressionally-defined period of time; or a fully targeted approach that 
uses economic conditions to determine the states that receive help, the amount of assistance, and 
the timing of fiscal relief.   
A. Uniform Approach to Medicaid/SCHIP Fiscal Relief  
If federal policymakers decide to provide states with fiscal relief to avert cuts to Medicaid and 
SCHIP, a uniform approach like that used in JGTRRA has several advantages.  First, guaranteed 
federal dollars provided to every state through a uniform formula could help assure that 
nationwide political forces support the policy change. This is one of several factors increasing 
this approach’s likelihood of enactment.  Second, a uniform approach to distributing funds is 
simple, which also eases enactment. By contrast, basing fiscal relief payments on state economic 
conditions may involve legislative specifications with considerable complexity, as is made clear 
below.  Third, the uniform FMAP increase during the prior economic downturn is widely viewed 
as having generally positive effects. Repeating a prior, successful policy has considerable appeal 
to policymakers since it builds on a positive track record.  Finally, federal costs are relatively 
predictable under this approach, since the amount of federal assistance does not depend on how 
the economy fares in each state; federal costs are not entirely predictable, however, since the 
level of state Medicaid spending determines the amount of federal fiscal relief. 
B. A Partially Targeted Approach to Medicaid/SCHIP Fiscal Relief  
The JGTRRA approach could be modified to set criteria that states must satisfy to qualify for 
fiscal relief. Each state meeting the criteria would receive the same level of help, for a period of 
time that would be defined by Congress.  For example, the Economic Recovery in Health Care 
Act of 2008 (S. 2819) would provide five quarters of federal fiscal relief to a specified number of 
states with the highest annual decreases in employment, increases in food stamp participation, 
and increases in foreclosure rates.31  Each qualifying state would receive a uniform (1.667 
percentage point) increase in its federal matching rate. In addition, the bill would provide these 
states with federal block grants usable for a broad range of purposes. This approach combines 
some advantages and disadvantages of both the uniform approach, described above, and a fully 
targeted policy, analyzed in the following section. 
C. A Fully Targeted Approach
Under a fully targeted approach, changes in unemployment rates or other economic indicators 
would trigger the timing and extent of enhanced federal matching funds.  If the policy is 
structured effectively, assistance begins when it is needed and ends when economic conditions 
return to normal. States in difficult circumstances are not denied help while federal policymakers 
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take the time required to hammer out an agreement and supplemental federal resources do not 
continue after economic health is restored.   
With a fixed amount of federal funds available for Medicaid-related stimulus, a fully targeted 
policy means that the states in the most trouble receive more help than under other approaches. 
Greater assistance for states experiencing economic difficulty means less need to cut health 
coverage. According to the Congressional Budget Office, a more targeted approach that reduces 
the total amount of health cutbacks provides more effective economic stimulus.32 Focusing 
federal dollars on states experiencing the greatest level of economic distress likewise directs 
stimulus to the geographic areas where it is most needed.  
Compared to a uniform increase in match rates, a fully targeted approach would greatly reduce 
possible mismatches between state need and federal dollars. Like the partially targeted policy 
described above, this approach may appeal to policymakers who are concerned about the federal 
budget deficit, since it limits federal spending to states that need assistance. As noted above, state 
circumstances vary greatly today, so giving the same amount of help to every state would assist 
some that are doing fine while other states that are in serious trouble receive much less than they 
need.
Of course, the fully targeted approach is more responsive to state circumstances than is the 
partially targeted strategy. Only a fully targeted program would provide well-timed help to states 
that experience their deepest economic harm outside the period when a partially targeted policy 
would provide assistance. By the same token, if a state that is now in trouble remains in 
economic difficulty for only one or two more quarters, federal assistance will nevertheless 
continue, under the partially targeted approach. With the fully targeted approach, by contrast, 
assistance ends in each state once its economic conditions return to normal.  
Poorly targeted stimulus can exacerbate macroeconomic problems, even during a national 
economic downturn.  If fiscal relief dollars go to states with relatively healthy economies, the 
federal deficit can increase without the countervailing advantage of providing stimulus by 
preventing Medicaid cutbacks in an area of the country experiencing economic distress. An 
increased federal budget deficit ultimately increases long-term interest rates, harming economic 
growth.33 As applied specifically to state fiscal relief, such effects would be quite small, relative 
to the entire federal budget deficit and U.S. economy. However, Medicaid/SCHIP fiscal relief 
could be part of a much larger package of stimulus legislation; policymakers may wish to avoid 
federal spending, in any portion of such a package, that is not effective in providing necessary 
stimulus.   
A more targeted approach can also yield significant benefits when, as now, the country is 
beginning an economic downturn. Many of the largest Medicaid cutbacks may take place at the 
later stages of an economic slow-down, well after a formal recession has ended, as explained 
above.  A short, fixed-term stimulus package runs the risk of ending before it is most needed. By 
contrast, a mechanism of longer duration that reserves assistance to states experiencing 
significant difficulty can potentially help with the later stages of the current downturn.
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Temporary vs. Ongoing Duration of Fully Targeted Assistance – Policymakers could provide 
fully targeted aid through temporary federal legislation, which can be tailored to fit the unique 
features of the current economic downturn and which can limit, more reliably than any other 
approach, the federal government’s cost exposure. For example, such legislation might 
appropriate a specific amount of federal funds that could be used during the current or 
subsequent fiscal years. Such dollars would be spent only when a state’s economic conditions 
met requirements specified in the legislation. If a state qualified for aid during a particular 
quarter, its assistance would be included as an adjustment to its Medicaid matching funds for that 
quarter.
Alternatively, policymakers could adjust the ongoing structure of Medicaid and SCHIP to 
provide automatic, countercyclical adjustments during economic downturns, both with the 
present slowdown and in the future. If done properly, the latter approach would: 
x Eliminate the need for Congress to revisit this issue if the current downturn lasts more than 
five quarters; 
x Eliminate the need for future Congresses, at least once per recession, to decide whether and, 
if so, how to provide Medicaid-related state fiscal relief;
x Help the program serve as an automatic fiscal stabilizer, aiding economic recovery during the 
current and future downturns; and
x Both in future downturns and if the current slowdown lasts more than five quarters, avoid the 
delays that are inevitable when elected officials must take the time required to agree on a new 
federal statute. 
    
Designing a Fully Targeted Fiscal Stimulus Policy – Whether on a temporary or an ongoing 
basis, if policymakers wish to employ a fully targeted approach to providing federal assistance, 
several policy design issues are important to consider: 
x A Duration of Federal Assistance that is Sufficient but Not Excessive. Policymakers may 
wish to make federal funds available throughout a multi-year economic downturn, including 
its latter stages, after recession has formally ended. As noted above, Medicaid cutbacks often 
take place towards the end of a period of economic slowdown. Funding would need to end 
immediately once a state’s economy returns to normal.  
x Cyclical Focus. The goal of this approach is to help states with cyclical economic problems, 
not structural changes that are independent of the business cycle. That goal can be largely 
achieved by limiting federal assistance to periods in which more than a certain number of 
states are experiencing economic difficulty. Structural changes outside a downturn in the 
general business cycle include, for example, the effect on North Carolina of textile mill 
closures several years ago. These types of structural issues could be addressed by approaches 
other than those discussed in this paper.34
x An Amount of Assistance that Reflects State Economic Conditions. Assistance would 
compensate for two distinct fiscal problems – namely, increased health care costs and the 
Medicaid and SCHIP programs’ share of reduced state revenue. Both of these components 
would need to be carefully defined: 
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o The Downturn-Generated Increase in Health Care Costs. The amount of federal 
funds a state receives for such expenses would be based on expected increases in state 
Medicaid and SCHIP costs. This needs to take into account each state’s spending on 
the populations most likely to be affected by economic downturn – namely, low-
income children and families.35 States differ greatly in the proportion of Medicaid and 
SCHIP spending devoted to these eligibility groups (Figure 7).
FIGURE 7. THE NUMBER OF STATES WITH VARIOUS PERCENTAGES OF MEDICAID SPENDING 
ON THE POPULATIONS LEAST AFFECTED BY CHANGES IN THE BUSINESS CYCLE: FISCAL 
YEAR 2004  
2
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Under 50% 50 - 54.9% 55 - 59.9% 60 - 64.9% 65 -  69.9% 70 - 74.9% 75%+
Percentage of Medicaid spending on the elderly and disabled
Number of states
Source: Authors’ calculations, using the Urban Institute and KCMU estimates based on data from Medicaid Statistical Information
System reports from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2007. 
o Medicaid’s Share of Reduced State Revenue. If policymakers wish to prevent 
Medicaid and SCHIP cutbacks during recession, states need to be compensated for 
these health programs’ share of revenue shortfalls.36   For example, a state’s FMAP 
could be increased by an amount that equaled, for each 1 percentage point increase in 
a state’s unemployment rate, 3 to 4 percent of the state’s share of Medicaid and 
SCHIP costs.
Examples of Specific Approaches to Fully Targeted Relief. Fully targeted fiscal relief proposals 
have been proposed by the Government Accountability Office (GAO)37 and in legislation 
reauthorizing SCHIP38 that the Senate passed during the summer of 2007.  To illustrate the range 
of options and some key policy choices facing policymakers pursuing this approach, we have 
developed a series of variations on the GAO and Senate SCHIP formulas. These variations are 
described in detail in Appendix II and summarized in Table 4, below.  While these formulae all 
use state unemployment rates as the key factor that determines a state’s access to fiscal relief, 
similar policy design issues would arise if state economic conditions were measured using other 
criteria, such as those proposed in S. 2819.
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Brief Description of These Illustrative Policies and Their Impact- Table 5, below, shows, 
during the most recent economic downturn, how many states would have received help under 
each above-described approach to fully targeted assistance and, by contrast, under the enacted 
FMAP increase. For examples of how these fully targeted policies would have played out during 
earlier national and regional downturns, see Appendix III.  As Table 5 demonstrates, each fully 
targeted approach would have provided states with assistance long before the FMAP increase in 
2003-2004.  Compared with the targeted formulas, the JGTRRA fiscal relief came relatively late 
in the economic downturn, because assistance was delayed until federal policymakers could 
reach agreement.   
The GAO’s Original Formula (GAO I) gave states fiscal relief if 23 states experienced at least a 
10 percent increase in annual unemployment rates. Once this national trigger was met, a state 
would get help if it experienced any increase in unemployment, however slight. As a result, the 
GAO I approach helped almost all states for seven quarters, although the amount varied by state. 
Moreover, GAO I missed the early months of the economic downturn because the formula used a 
12-month period to measure current economic conditions. Providing assistance only when 23 or 
more states experienced the requisite economic difficulty denied help during cyclical downturns 
that affected a smaller number of states, such as the “oil patch” recession of the mid- to late-
1980s (See Appendix III, Appendix Table 2).
The GAO II Formula measured economic conditions based on 6 rather than 12 months of 
unemployment data. As a result, it took less time to “pick up” economic decline and so provided 
help before the original GAO formula. Assistance was based on a comparison between current 
economic conditions and those either one or two years in the past, so assistance extended slightly 
longer than under the GAO I formula. Finally, to help during regional downturns and when states 
entered a national slowdown unusually early or left it unusually late, GAO II also aided states 
with more severe increases in unemployment of 20 percent or more, so long as at least 3 states 
experienced such effects.   
The Original SCHIP Formula (SCHIP I) 39 provided a contingency bonus to any state with an 
average quarterly unemployment rate that was at least 5.5 percent and at least 20 percent higher 
than the state's average over the past three years. While it provided help earlier than the 2003-
2004 FMAP increase, the formula benefited fewer states because it helped only states with 
unemployment rates above specified levels.  
The SCHIP II Formula slightly modified the original SCHIP approach by comparing current 
unemployment rates to the same period during each of the three previous years, rather than to the 
average over the previous three years. This small, seemingly technical change had an enormous 
impact. Under SCHIP I, a few quarters of high unemployment in a state often disqualified 
subsequent quarters from federal help, even if the state remained in serious economic trouble. By 
avoiding such averages and instead comparing current conditions to the same period of time 
during several earlier years, SCHIP II helped many more states, particularly during the latter 
stages of the downturn. For example, only SCHIP II would have provided any states with help 
during the final two quarters of the FMAP increase in 2003-2004.  
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The SCHIP III Formula made further changes, requiring at least six states to experience 
threshold levels of harm before any federal assistance was available. Unlike SCHIP I and II, this 
avoided helping a tiny number of states during 2005 that may have been experiencing structural 
rather than cyclical declines. SCHIP III also triggered aid based on a 1.0 percentage point 
increase in unemployment. By eliminating the 5.5 percent unemployment requirement of SCHIP 
I and II, SCHIP III  aided states with low prior levels of unemployment; this was the main reason 
why SCHIP III helped more states than did SCHIP I and II. At the same time, by requiring a 1.0 
percentage point increase in unemployment rather than a 20 percent increase, SCHIP III 
established a level playing field for states that had high prior levels of unemployment (see the 
following text box for further explanation). 
States with Low, Medium, and High Unemployment: Effects of SCHIP I, II, and III
SCHIP I and II triggered assistance based on state unemployment rates that were at least (a) 5.5 
percent and (b) 20 percent above prior levels. SCHIP III instead required a 1.0 percentage point 
increase. The latter approach provided more help to states with either unusually low and or 
unusually high prior levels of unemployment. The goal was to assist states that experience the 
same amount of economic decline, regardless of how well they generally fare in the global 
economy, independently of the business cycle. For example: 
x In State A, unemployment rose from 4.0 percent to 5.0 percent. SCHIP I and II provided no 
help, since the later unemployment rate was below 5.5 percent. SCHIP III provided 
assistance, since that formula did not require a state to reach an absolute threshold level of 
current unemployment.  
x In State B, unemployment rose from 5.0 percent to 6.0 percent. It qualified under all three 
formulae since its later unemployment rate exceeded 5.5 percent and was both 20 percent and 
1.0 percentage points above prior levels.
x In State C, unemployment rose from 6.0 percent to 7.0 percent. SCHIP I and II provided no 
help, since unemployment increased by only 16.7 percent. The state qualified for aid under 
SCHIP III, since unemployment rose by 1.0 percentage points.  
Among all the formulae, only SCHIP II and SCHIP III provided assistance during the later stages 
of the economic downturn, since they were the only policies that compared current levels of 
unemployment to those during the same calendar period in each of the three previous years.  The 
goal of such a 3-year "look back" period was to provide each disrupted state with assistance until 
its economy returned to normal.  
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TABLE 5. QUARTERLY UNEMPLOYMENT RATES AND THE NUMBER OF STATES RECEIVING 
ASSISTANCE UNDER VARIOUS FORMULAE: 2000-2005 
Number of states receiving assistance under each formula 
National 
unemployment 
rate
2003-
2004
FMAP
increase 
GAO I GAO II SCHIP I 
SCHIP II SCHIP III 
2000 4.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2001 4.2 0 0 5 0 0 0 
4.4 0 0 48 1 1 6 
4.8 0 0 49 5 5 13 
5.5 0 0 50 13 15 25 
2002 5.7 0 50 50 18 20 35 
5.8 0 50 50 18 21 39 
5.7 0 50 50 16 22 39 
5.9 0 50 49 17 22 40 
2003 5.9 0 49 49 15 24 42 
6.1 51 49 50 16 30 44 
6.1 51 50 50 11 30 41 
5.8 51 0 50 4 24 30 
2004 5.7 51 0 3 0 20 37 
5.6 51 0 0 0 13 28 
5.4 0 0 0 0 6 17 
5.4 0 0 0 0 4 8 
2005 5.3 0 0 0 0 1 0 
5.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5.0 0 0 0 2 2 0 
5.0 0 0 0 2 2 0 
Source: Authors’ calculations, Bureau of Labor Statistics, state monthly unemployment rates, seasonally adjusted.  
Notes: National unemployment rates represent the average, for each calendar quarter, of monthly, seasonally adjusted 
unemployment.  For a description of these options see Table 4 and Appendix II. 
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5. Conclusion 
As a new economic downturn unfolds, many states appear headed for serious budget shortfalls. 
Economic hard times reduce state revenues and increase the number of people who qualify for 
need-based benefit programs. Because of state balanced budget requirements, these trends 
eventually cause many states to increase taxes and fees or cut Medicaid, SCHIP, and other 
services. As a result, economic stimulus and help for vulnerable residents are withdrawn 
precisely when they are most needed. The federal government does not have balanced budget 
requirements, so it has the flexibility to provide additional resources to states that are 
experiencing an economic downturn.  These resources could help lessen the need to make 
Medicaid and SCHIP cuts at times when publicly funded health care services and the resulting 
economic stimulus are most needed.   
Federal policymakers have many different options for providing this assistance. In structuring 
fiscal relief, the basic question facing lawmakers is the extent to which aid should be based on 
the economic conditions in each state. More finely targeted aid can provide additional help to 
states experiencing the deepest level of economic distress. On the other hand, to the extent that 
policymakers seek to target aid based on state economic conditions, the relevant policy design 
issues grow more complex.  Regardless of which approach federal lawmakers prefer, the severity 
of emerging state budget problems suggests that policymakers need to give serious consideration 
to providing troubled states with fiscal relief, including assistance that eliminates the need to cut 
back health coverage during economic downturn.  
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Appendix I 
Estimating the Effects of Unemployment on Coverage:  Methods 
The regression models were estimated separately for non-elderly adults (aged 18-64) and 
children (aged 0-17).  Both groups included disabled and non-disabled individuals.  The key 
explanatory variables were the contemporary state unemployment rate and the unemployment 
rate one year in the past, using the sum of the two effects in our results.  Control variables 
included those listed below, with asterisks identifying variables that included both 
contemporaneous measures and measures one year in the past: 
x A proxy measure for state health insurance costs;*
x The percent of children under the state’s income threshold for child poverty-related Medicaid 
eligibility or SCHIP;* 
x The percent of non-elderly adults under the state’s income threshold for Medicaid eligibility 
through 1115 waivers;*
x State income thresholds for a three-person family’s Medicaid eligibility under the former Aid 
to Families With Dependent Children program (AFDC) and Social Security Act Section 
1931;*
x State demographic variables, including average age and state racial/ethnic composition; 
x The average probability in the state that family income is less than 200% of the federal 
poverty level (FPL), based on factors assumed to be exogenous (e.g., age, gender, education, 
marital status); 
x The share of state residents not living in a Metropolitan Statistical Area; 
x Post-1993, post-1996, and post-1998 dummies (to capture changes in the CPS); and 
x State fixed effects. 
To estimate the effect of a 1.0 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate on Medicaid 
and SCHIP spending for 2008, we projected what insurance coverage in 2008 would be in the 
absence of an economic downturn.  To estimate the increase in the number of children and adults 
in the U.S., we used population growth trends since 2000.  This resulted in an estimated 2008 
population of 78.6 million children and 186.4 million non-elderly adults.  
We then estimated the insurance coverage rates for children and adults by extrapolating from the 
2004-2006 change, assuming that observed changes in coverage for each of the four insurance 
categories from 2004-2006 would continue between 2006 and 2008.  After determining the 
“baseline” coverage levels for 2008, we applied the estimated effects of increased unemployment 
on the percentage of individuals with various types of coverage to ascertain the number of 
children and adults who would enroll in Medicaid and SCHIP in response to a 1.0 percentage 
point increase in the unemployment rate. 
The next step was to use data on Medicaid and SCHIP spending per enrollee to estimate the 
impact of these enrollment changes on Medicaid and SCHIP costs.  Earlier research on this topic 
found that people with disabilities comprise 25% of the non-elderly adults who newly enroll 
because of increased unemployment.40   Accordingly, we derived a weighted average of current 
Medicaid spending for adults under age 65, assuming that 25 percent of new enrollees would 
have disabilities. We then discounted this weighted average of current costs by 20 percent, based 
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on evidence that adults with employer-sponsored insurance cost less, on average, than adults 
already on Medicaid.41   This last step may have underestimated spending increases resulting 
from unemployment because, among non-elderly adults eligible for Medicaid, those with health 
problems are disproportionately likely to enroll.42   For children, we assumed that the newly 
enrolled would have the same average costs as current beneficiaries.
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Appendix II 
Description of Fully Targeted Fiscal Relief Approaches 
The GAO’s original approach (GAO I)
Several years ago, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) developed and analyzed 
several possible approaches to helping Medicaid programs during economic downturns.43  One 
policy used a national trigger with federal resources targeted based on state need. To limit 
assistance to periods of national economic decline, federal funds would be available only if 23 or 
more states experienced unemployment levels at least 10 percent higher than during the same 
period the previous year. Once the national trigger was met, a state could qualify for aid by 
showing any increase in unemployment, no matter how slight. However, the amount of 
assistance would depend on the extent to which unemployment in a state was worse than in the 
past. To limit the possibility of statistical error, the formula measured current levels of 
unemployment by averaging the most recent 12 months of each state’s unemployment data.  
Because of the 12-month average used to define current unemployment levels, it can take a long 
time for this formula to pick up a sharp economic decline. As a result, federal assistance can miss 
the early portion of an economic slowdown. It can also stop during a downturn even if the 
national unemployment rate is still high and increasing, as would have happened in 1982 (see 
Appendix III, Appendix Table 1). Providing assistance only when 23 or more states experienced 
the requisite economic difficulty would have denied help during cyclical downturns that affected 
a smaller number of states, such as the “oil patch” recession of the mid- to late-1980s (see 
Appendix III, Appendix Table 2). It also would have denied assistance to states that entered a 
national downturn unusually early, compared to other states, or left it unusually late. Finally, 
using a 1-year rather than a longer “look back” period to compare current unemployment rates 
with previous levels meant that assistance would have been unavailable during later periods of 
economic slowdowns, including three out of the five quarters for which enhanced FMAP was 
paid during 2003-2004 (Table 5). 
A modified version of the GAO formula (GAO II)
As GAO acknowledged, policymakers could modify each element of its illustrative formula. For 
example: 
x To provide a speedier response to changed economic conditions, unemployment could be 
measured based on 6-month rather than 12-month averages.  
x To make federal dollars available after the early stages of an economic downturn, the “look 
back” or comparison period could last 2 years rather than 1 year.  For instance, assume that 
the unemployment rate increased from 5.0 percent in year one to 5.5 percent in year 2 and 5.8 
percent in year 3.  With a one year “look back” a state would satisfy the requirement of a 10 
percent increase in unemployment over baseline levels in year 2 but not in year 3.  With a 
two year “look back”, the 5.8 percent rate would be compared to the 5.0 percent baseline and 
assistance could continue.  The purpose of a lengthened look-back period (whether for 2 or 3 
years) is to permit federal assistance to last until a state’s economy returns to normal.  
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x During periods when the national trigger is not met, but a small number of states are 
experiencing severe downturns, help could be available to a state experiencing at least a 20 
percent increase in unemployment, so long as it was one of at least three states experiencing 
that level of harm. 
The SCHIP original formula (SCHIP I)
The original Senate-passed legislation reauthorizing SCHIP provided “contingency” bonuses to 
states when their unemployment rates reached certain levels. Under the bill, such bonuses would 
be paid if, during a three-month period, a state’s unemployment rate exceeded 5.5 percent and 
was at least 20 percent higher than during the average for the three prior years. This use of 
averages meant that, if a state experienced several quarters of very high unemployment, the state 
could be denied federal assistance in subsequent quarters, even if unemployment remained at 
high levels.
SCHIP formula – slight modifications (SCHIP II)
Under a modified version of the SCHIP contingency bonus proposal, assistance would go to a 
state if, during a calendar quarter, its seasonally-adjusted, average monthly unemployment rate 
was at least 5.5 percent and at least 20 percent higher than during the same quarter in any of the 
three prior years. The significant impact of this one small change – namely, using parallel 
calendar periods, rather than multi-year averages, as the basis for comparison with current 
unemployment rates – is shown by the period covered by the temporary FMAP increase earlier 
this decade:44
x In the third quarter of 2003, the modified SCHIP formula would have helped 30 states, and 
the unmodified formula would have helped 11;  
x During the fourth quarter of 2003, the modified formula would have helped 24 states, and the 
unmodified formula would have helped 4; and 
x In the first quarter of 2004, the modified formula would have helped 20 states, and the 
unmodified formula would have helped none.  
SCHIP formula – major modifications (SCHIP III)
The SCHIP formula could be further modified to base payments purely on the difference 
between current and former levels of unemployment, without requiring a state to exceed 5.5 
percent unemployment. Eliminating the latter requirement would compensate states for 
economic declines even if their baseline economies were unusually healthy.  To measure current 
economic conditions, 6-month averages could be used, thus providing more reliability than 
quarterly averages. To prevent assistance from going to one or two states that are experiencing 
structural rather than cyclical declines, while still providing help during significant but sub-
national downturns in the business cycle, bonuses could be limited to periods in which at least 6 
states experience elevated levels of unemployment. Finally, a 1 percentage point increase in 
unemployment, rather than a 20 percent increase, could lead to assistance, providing more of a 
level playing field for the states with the highest prior levels of unemployment.  For example, an 
increase in a state’s unemployment rate from 5.0% to 6.0% would meet the 20 percent 
requirement, but a different state’s increase from 6.0% to 7.0% would not.  
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Appendix III 
The Impact of Alternative Formulas in Earlier Periods 
The following tables show how each fully targeted formula described in the final part of the 
paper would have applied during several national and regional downturns from 1980 through 
2000.
APPENDIX TABLE 1. QUARTERLY UNEMPLOYMENT RATES AND THE NUMBER OF STATES 
RECEIVING ASSISTANCE UNDER VARIOUS FORMULAE: NATIONAL DOWNTURN OF 1980-1984 
Number of states receiving assistance under  each formulaNational unemployment rate GAO I  GAO II  SCHIP I SCHIP II SCHIP III 
1980 6.3 0 10 7 13 11 
7.3 0 50 16 27 25 
7.7 0 51 24 34 37 
7.4 50 51 21 31 41 
1981 7.4 51 51 19 26 37 
7.4 51 50 20 30 35 
7.4 51 51 20 32 38 
8.2 51 51 32 37 39 
1982 8.8 51 51 35 42 46 
9.4 0 51 40 45 50 
9.9 0 51 43 49 49 
10.7 51 51 42 48 48 
1983 10.4 51 51 35 49 50 
10.1 51 51 18 44 50 
9.4 51 51 5 29 43 
8.5 49 51 2 16 30 
1984 7.9 0 4 0 10 21 
7.4 0 0 0 4 11 
7.4 0 0 0 3 0 
7.3 0 0 0 3 0 
Source: Authors’ calculations, Bureau of Labor Statistics, state monthly unemployment rates, seasonally adjusted 
Notes: For an explanation of each formula, see notes to Table 5, in text.  
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The following table shows the unsurprising result that limiting assistance to periods of national 
economic decline, as with the GAO I formula, means that, in a sub-national recession, affected 
states get no help. It also shows that, when assistance is limited to periods in which a small, 
threshold number of states (such as 6, under the SCHIP III formula) experience significant 
economic harm, help can go to states experiencing significant, sub-national downturns without 
assisting one or two states that may be experiencing structural rather than cyclical problems; 
states in the latter category would receive federal funds under an approach like that taken under 
the SCHIP I and II formulas, in which any state experiencing severe harm receives federal help. 
APPENDIX TABLE 2. QUARTERLY UNEMPLOYMENT RATES AND THE NUMBER OF STATES 
RECEIVING ASSISTANCE UNDER VARIOUS FORMULAE: “OIL-PATCH” RECESSION OF 1985-1988 
Number of states receiving assistance under  each formulaNational unemployment rate GAO I  GAO II  SCHIP I SCHIP II SCHIP III 
1985 7.2 0 0 0 3 0 
7.3 0 0 0 3 0 
7.2 0 0 0 2 0 
7.0 0 0 0 2 0 
1986 7.0 0 0 0 3 0 
7.2 0 5 1 6 9 
7.0 0 6 3 6 9 
6.8 0 6 3 6 9 
1987 6.6 0 4 3 5 8 
6.3 0 3 1 5 7 
6.0 0 3 0 4 6 
5.8 0 0 0 3 0 
1988 5.7 0 0 0 0 0 
5.5 0 0 0 0 0 
5.5 0 0 0 0 0 
5.3 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: Authors’ calculations, Bureau of Labor Statistics, state monthly unemployment rates, seasonally adjusted 
Notes: For an explanation of each formula, see notes to Table 5, in text. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 3. QUARTERLY UNEMPLOYMENT RATES AND THE NUMBER OF STATES 
RECEIVING ASSISTANCE UNDER VARIOUS FORMULAE: NATIONAL DOWNTURN OF 1990-1994
Number of states receiving assistance under each formula  National  
unemployment rate GAO I  GAO II  SCHIP I SCHIP II SCHIP III 
1990 5.3 0 7 0 0 6 
5.3 0 8 2 2 7 
5.7 0 9 3 4 8 
6.1 0 15 10 13 14 
1991 6.6 0 49 19 26 22 
6.8 0 50 19 29 28 
6.9 0 48 18 25 30 
7.1 48 48 24 27 28 
1992 7.4 50 50 27 31 31 
7.6 50 50 25 31 35 
7.6 51 51 18 31 35 
7.4 49 51 6 27 34 
1993 7.1 0 50 2 26 30 
7.1 0 5 1 17 27 
6.8 0 3 0 14 22 
6.6 0 0 0 8 14 
1994 6.6 0 0 0 2 9 
6.2 0 0 0 0 0 
6.0 0 0 0 0 0 
5.6 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: Authors’ calculations, Bureau of Labor Statistics, state monthly unemployment rates, seasonally adjusted 
Notes: For an explanation of each formula, see notes to Table 5, in text.
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A d d i t i o n a l  c o p i e s  o f  t h i s  r e p o r t  ( # • • • • )  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  
o n  t h e  K a i s e r  F a m i l y  F o u n d a t i o n ’ s  w e b s i t e  a t  w w w . k f f . o r g .
tional copies of  this report (#7770) are available 
on the aiser a ily Foundation’s website at www.kff.org.
